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ABSTRACT
Autonomous and connected vehicles (ACVs) are a transformational
force for humanity. It is highly likely that some owners of ACVs will
circumvent their vehicle software to expose unauthorized functionality,
known as “jailbreaking”. This would trigger copyright liability, the ex-
tent of which would be dependent upon the copyright system’s various
rulemaking processes and common law interpretations. This note ex-
plores the world of software “jailbreaking”, with its roots in
smartphone unlocking, and extrapolates that to ACVs. Some compel-
ling (and at times dangerous) scenarios are contemplated, and recom-
mendations are made for consumers, technologists, manufacturers, and
policy makers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
  This paper aims to explore the legal repercussions of jailbreaking Autono-
mous and Connected Vehicles (“ACVs”), as applied to those who develop,
distribute, install, and use such software. Jailbreaking is the act of lifting
manufacturer-imposed restrictions on software operating systems, unlocking
a host of latent, unauthorized capabilities.1 ACV jailbreaking is an important
concern because ACVs will transform automotive transportation as we know
it. ACVs are one of the major technological leaps of our lifetime, ushering in
an era where crashes rarely ever result in fatalities,2 cities are transformed by
new land use patterns,3 and consumers are spared the burdensome cost of
motor vehicle ownership,4 among countless other benefits. They will also
dramatically reshape the economy.5
1. Jailbreaks are fundamentally different from cyberattacks. Technologically speaking,
the acts are similar, but from both a practical and legal standpoint, they are entirely different.
The distinction is best captured by intention – cyberattacks are a malicious, unwanted event
that could occur to ACVs, while jailbreaking is a user-initiated event upon a vehicle users
already own to achieve their desired aims. Jailbreakers willingly install, use, and take advan-
tage of the circumvention’s capabilities.
2. See James M. Anderson et al., Autonomous Vehicle Technology: A Guide for
Policymakers, at xiv RAND (2016), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_re
ports/RR400/RR443-2/RAND_RR443-2.pdf.
3. Id. at xvi (explaining that “[ACVs] may lead to increased density as a result of the
decreased need for proximate parking . . . [since] approximately 31 percent of space in the
central business districts of 41 major cities was devoted to parking” (citing Shoup, 2005)).
4. Id. at 19.
5. ACVs are expected to displace 5 million jobs in the transportation industry, which
accounts for 3% of the workforce. “Auto dealerships, car washes, gas stations, and parking lots
might shut down completely,” eliminating even more collateral jobs. Steven Greenhouse, Au-
tonomous vehicles could cost America 5 million jobs. What should we do about it?, L.A. TIMES
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The technological development and deployment of ACVs will be a
mixed process – there is no one path to ACV adoption. One deployment
scenario is for transportation network companies (“TNCs”), such as Uber
and Lyft, which provide mobile applications to connect passengers to driv-
ers, to convert their fleet of human-driven vehicles into ACVs.6 This model
would not give rise to jailbreaking, since TNCs would be in complete con-
trol of their vehicles. However, there will be some period of time in which
the current model of individually owned vehicles will continue, only that
such vehicles will become ACVs. This is a necessary condition for the jail-
breaking contemplated in this paper, since only individual ACV owners
would jailbreak their own vehicles.
There are compelling reasons for ACV owners to jailbreak their vehi-
cles. Some of these are relatively innocuous and coincide with societal
norms of product ownership, while others present the potential for serious
harms and raise serious moral questions, such as programming a vehicle to
prioritize a passenger over a pedestrian in a “no-win” collision scenario.
Harms include economic loss, property damage, personal injury, and death.
The risk of these harms is unlike the circumvention of other types of elec-
tronic machinery, such as smartphone jailbreaking.
Circumvention of electronics is governed by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), and ACV jailbreaks would be subject to this law.
However, it is not equipped to deal with circumventions that could lead to
the serious harms and moral dilemmas just described. It is therefore neces-
sary to propose new legislation or regulation to handle this unique circum-
stance, outside the ambit of the copyright system. Technologists and policy
makers both should play an active part in shaping such laws.
Some terminology in this report merits clarification. The term “ACV
companies” refers to ACV manufacturers, component/parts suppliers,
software providers, transportation network companies, and other businesses
in the ACV ecosystem collectively. Manufacturers are referred to as original
(Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-greenhouse-driverless-job-loss-
20160922-snap-story.html.
6. These types of companies have rapidly become more involved in ACV development
and deployment, since integrating autonomous capabilities into their fleet would eliminate the
high cost of employing human drivers. Uber, in partnership with Volvo, and with the help of a
team of roboticists lured away from Carnegie Mellon University, is deploying autonomous
custom Volvo XC90 vehicles in Pittsburgh, supervised by humans in the “driver’s” seat. See
Max Chafkin, First Self-Driving Fleet Arrives in Pittsburgh This Month, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
18, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-08-18/uber-s-first-self-driving-
fleet-arrives-in-pittsburgh-this-month-is06r7on; See also John Zimmer, The Third Transporta-
tion Revolution: Lyft’s Vision for the Next Ten Years and Beyond, MEDIUM (Sept. 18, 2016),
https://medium.com/@johnzimmer/the-third-transportation-revolution-27860f05fa91; See also
Jake Maxwell Watts, World’s First Self-Driving Taxis Hit the Road in Singapore, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 25, 2016, 6:51AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/worlds-first-self-driving-taxis-hit-the-
road-in-singapore-1472102747.
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equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), when it is important to distinguish
them from other ACV companies.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dawn of ACVs
  Since Google unveiled its autonomous vehicle project in 2010, there has
been steady progress across both the automotive and software industries to
develop this technology, with support from research universities as well as
state and federal governments.7 The utility of ACVs is without question:
their widespread deployment would sharply curtail traffic fatalities, reclaim
much-needed space in urban environments, and provide a host of other
benefits.8
The World Health Organization estimates that 1.25 million people die
from auto-related accidents each year, with half of these deaths being
pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists.9 Vehicles are the leading cause of
death for people between 15 to 29 years old.10 On a miles-driven basis,
ACVs are potentially far safer than human-driven motor vehicles, and are
not prone to human fallibilities like driving while intoxicated, drowsy, or
distracted.11 Global ACV adoption would thus potentially improve these
grim statistics.12 It is estimated that by 2035, 75 percent of vehicles will
possess some degree of autonomous capability.13
Today, motor vehicles are mostly owned by the same people who oper-
ate them: consumers. For some period of time during the progression of
ACV technology, consumers will continue to be the predominant owners
and operators of motor vehicles, but at some point, different deployment
patterns will emerge, including that of TNCs, discussed in the introduction.
ACV manufacturers will gradually increase their vehicles’ autonomous
capabilities, some of which are already found in today’s vehicles.14 Eventu-
ally, these vehicles will become fully autonomous. Tesla Motors’ Model S is
7. John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html.
8. See Anderson et al., supra note 2.




11. See Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 12.
12. See Matt McFarland, How Self-Driving Cars Would Benefit Americans More Than
World Peace, WASH. POST. (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innova-
tions/wp/2015/02/10/how- self-driving-cars-would-benefit-americans-more-than-world-peace/.
13. See Richard Martin, Three-Quarters of Vehicles Sold in 2035 Are Expected to Have
Autonomous Capability, NAVIGANT CONSULTING (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.navigant
research.com/newsroom/three-quarters-of-vehicles-sold-in-2035-are-expected-to-have-autono
mous-capability.
14. Id. at 5.
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an example of this development roadmap.15 It is equipped with hardware that
evolves through the periodic introduction of software updates.16 Such a
software model necessitates a whole-car operating system that invites cir-
cumvention, as opposed to having to circumvent each automotive compo-
nent piecemeal, as is required by today’s automobiles. In fact, such
operating systems will be a key component in the ACV supply chain, with
both automotive and technology companies vying to dominate the market.17
B. Reasons to Jailbreak
  A jailbreak is a version of the operating system with the OEM’s default
restrictions lifted, allowing for a number of factory-unauthorized functions.
The term stems from the idea that a device is broken out of its “jail”.18 There
are many compelling reasons for ACV owners to jailbreak their vehicles.
These include overriding traffic safety programming, enabling high perform-
ance driving, circumscribing statutory controls on driving times and loca-
tions, disabling location tracking for privacy, hiding from law enforcement,
and prioritizing vehicle occupants over potential victims in a crash scenario.
1. Smartphone Jailbreaking
  Since the debut of the Apple iPhone in 2007, people have found ways to
lift the software restrictions imposed by iOS, the device’s operating system,
and extend the functionality of their smartphones.19 This activity did not
have the protection of the copyright system until 2010.20
In the smartphone context, jailbreaking has been used to unlock all sorts
of functionality.21 On the iPhone, jailbreaking allows the installation of un-
approved apps. It also allows users to apply custom visual themes. In the
15. See The Tesla Motors Team, Your Autopilot has Arrived, THE TESLA BLOG (Oct. 14,
2015), https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/your-autopilot-has-arrived/; See also Tim Higgins,
Tesla Expects to Demonstrate Self-Driven Cross-Country Trip Next Year, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
19, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-expects-to-demonstrate-self-driven-cross-coun-
try-trip-next-year-1476925700.
16. The Tesla Motors Team, supra note 16.
17. ECONOMIST, Who’s self-driving your car? (Sept. 24, 2016), http://www.economist
.com/news/business/21707600-battle-driverless-cars-revs-up-whos-self-driving-your-car (“All
parties recognize that the biggest profits from autonomy will come from producing an ‘operat-
ing system’—something that integrates the software and algorithms that process and interpret
information from sensors and maps and the mechanical parts of the car. Tech firms probably
have the edge here.”).
18. See Mike Keller, Geek 101: What Is Jailbreaking?, PCWORLD (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/249091/geek_101_what_is_jailbreaking_.html.
19. In 2010, about 10 percent of all iPhone users had jailbroken their devices. See Deb
Shindler, Pros and Cons of Jailbreaking or Rooting Your Smartphone, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug.
20, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/smartphones/pros-and-cons-of-jail
breaking-or-rooting-your-smartphone/.
20. See Jenna Wortham, In Ruling on iPhones, Apple Loses a Bit of Its Grip, N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/technology/27iphone.html.
21. See Shindler, supra note 19.
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early days, it allowed users to sort apps into folders, years before such func-
tionality was available. Perhaps the most enticing use of a jailbroken phone
is to unlock it from its carrier, allowing the device to be used on other carri-
ers without having to pay for a separate carrier-specific device.22 On the
Android platform, “rooting” (the Android equivalent of jailbreaking) allows
for drastic boosts to performance and battery life.23 Since the vanilla operat-
ing system must cater to hundreds of millions of users, conservative defaults
are used for these parameters, but jailbreaking/rooting allows for user-spe-
cific customization.
OEMs have been reluctant to tolerate this activity. Apple in particular is
engaged in a decade-long arms race with the iOS jailbreaking community,
with one side finding a new way to gain access and the other patching it, ad
infinitum24 Apple itself has not legally threatened this enthusiast community.
It has even on multiple occasions thanked it for finding software security
vulnerabilities (“bugs”) in iOS, with the gratitude mentioned in the release
notes of a software update.25 It has also gone so far as to hire a member of
the jailbreak community.26
OEMs could similarly “collaborate” with the jailbreaking community,
benefiting from their detection of bugs which could otherwise be used by
malicious actors in a cyberattack. As in smartphone jailbreaking, such activ-
22. This function has since been legalized by an act of Congress, the Unlocking Con-
sumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act of 2014, which overrides the Library of Con-
gress’s rules on the matter. Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act,
Pub.L. 113–144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014).
23. Both “rooting” and “jailbreaking” can be used interchangeably, and in the context of
this paper, jailbreaking will be the term used. “Unlocking” a smartphone so that it works
across multiple cellular carriers instead of being locked into just one is recognized as a variant
of jailbreaking, and all instances of jailbreaking in this paper will be inclusive of unlocking.
24. It should be noted that the incentive to jailbreak smartphones has decreased consid-
erably over time, as manufacturers have slowly added the functionality that users were origi-
nally installing jailbroken OSs for. See Kim-Mai Cutler, Umeng, The Flurry of China, Says
iOS Jailbreaking Is On The Decline, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/
2012/11/14/umeng-jailbreaking/.
25. See Filip Truta, Apple Thanks PanguTeam for Exposing iOS Flaw, Kills Their Jail-
break, SOFTPEDIA (Nov. 18, 2014 14:41 GMT), http://news.softpedia.com/news/Apple-
Thanks-PanguTeam-for-Exposing-iOS-Flaw-Kills-their-Jailbreak-465274.shtml; See also
Luke Dormehl, Apple Thanks Jailbreakers for Tightening Up iOS 7.1 Security, CULT OF MAC
(Mar. 11, 2014, 3:03 AM), http://www.cultofmac.com/269479/apple-thanks-jailbreakers-tight-
ening-ios-7-1-security/; See also Matthew Panzarino, Apple credits evad3rs jailbreak team
with 4 of 6 software bugs fixed in iOS 6.1.3, THE NEXT WEB (Mar. 19, 2013), http://
thenextweb.com/apple/2013/03/19/apple-credits-evad3rs-jailbreak-team-with-4-of-6-software-
bugs-fixed-in-ios-6-1-3/.
26. See Jeff Benjamin, iOS jailbreak hacker Winocm joining Apple later this year,
IDOWNLOADBLOG (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.idownloadblog.com/2014/02/21/ios-jailbreak-
hacker-winocm-joining-apple-later-this-year/.
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ity for ACVs would still be prohibited by contract, but companies may
merely turn a blind eye.27
2. ACV-specific Incentives
  Like for smartphones, jailbreaking ACVs may confer a number of advan-
tages to end-users.28 The incentives may be strong enough to compel end-
users to violate the law. The governing legal framework of jailbreaking, cop-
yright law, is likely insufficient to deter this activity.
For example, ACVs will likely be programmed to comply with all traf-
fic laws and regulations, but an end user may attempt to override that pro-
gramming, ostensibly to get somewhere faster. The incentive to do so may
be strong enough despite the potential for criminal liability.29
Extending the idea of overriding traffic laws, an ACV jailbreak may
even allow for a “performance racing mode”, whereby an ACV is program-
med to drive as if it were in NASCAR or Le Mans. Most drivers do not
possess the ability to drive at a professional level, but such a feature could
offer this unique experience. This is a novel scenario we are yet to witness
on public roadways.30
Another use would be to route around legislatively proscribed limita-
tions on where and when ACVs could be used. It is possible for govern-
ments to pass laws that prevent ACVs from being used in certain locations,
during certain hours, and in certain ways. A current example of this type of
law is London’s congestion charge, which limits when drivers are permitted
to operate in the core area of the city.31 An ACV’s default programming
would obey these laws, as it would for general traffic safety laws. ACV end-
users could bypass these restrictions and drive freely anywhere and anytime
they please. This is also useful in a navigational context, whereby end-users
could traverse prohibited roads to get to their destination faster. This would
likely endanger them, since certain roads might be prohibited due to ACVs
27. See Domenick Yoney, Tesla Model S owners hack their cars, find Ubuntu,
AUTOBLOG (Apr. 12, 2014 5:00 PM), http://www.autoblog.com/2014/04/12/tesla-model-s-
owners-hack-their-cars-find-ubuntu/ (quoting Tesla Motors, Motor Vehicle Purchase Agree-
ment, “You may not, or may not attempt to, reverse engineer, disassemble, decompile, tamper
with or engage in any similar activity in respect of a Tesla Vehicle, nor may you permit any
third party to do so, save only to the extent permitted by applicable law.”).
28. See Jack Stewart, Tesla’s Plan to Rule the Auto Industry? In-App Purchases,
WIRED (June 10, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/teslas-plan-rule-auto-in-
dustry-app-purchases/all/1. (“This raises the possibility of a black market for hacks to enable
these features at no cost. Who’ll be the first to jailbreak a Tesla?”).
29. See Symposium, Criminal Liability Issues Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1160 n.8 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/
vol52/iss4/2128.
30. Alex Davies, Audi’s Self-Driving Car Hits 150 MPH on an F1 Track, WIRED (Oct.
24, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/audis-self-driving-car-hits-150-mph-f1-track/all/1.
31. See Mayor of London, Congestion Charge Factsheet, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON
(June 2014), http://content.tfl.gov.uk/congestion-charge-factsheet.pdf.
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being not technically able to navigate them. The incentive remains, however,
as it’s theoretically possible for an end-user to upload additional software
that could render such “impassable” roads traversable.
In addition to bypassing prohibited driving areas, jailbreaking could also
help owners disable safety features. ACVs at varying degrees of autonomy
will require alerting drivers to resume control when road conditions are no
longer fit for the vehicle to drive itself.32 Some manufacturers have already
contemplated how such warning systems would operate in ACVs.33 Jail-
breaks would allow circumventing such features.
One reason to jailbreak is to disable GPS location tracking, namely to
protect privacy (assuming such tracking is not critical to vehicle function-
ing).34 Most, if not all, ACVs will track location information, and some peo-
ple fear that companies like Google will take advantage of this personal data
for unwanted purposes.35 Targeted advertising is the most common, if some-
what innocuous, reason.
Disabling location tracking has purposes besides privacy, such as avoid-
ing law enforcement, which could theoretically be able to send a signal to an
ACV to bring the vehicle to a safe stop at a given location.36 This type of
capability may or may not be legal under the Fourth Amendment, but if it is
ruled to be legal within the ACV traffic stop context, end-users could be
given the tool to disable it.37
In a similar vein, jailbreaks could allow end-users to defeat forensic
“black-box” crash data recorders. Some legislation already requires ACV
OEM’s to store user-related data recorded in the moments before a crash,
32. The 2016 death of Joshua Brown in his Tesla Model A was the first recorded in-
stance of the importance of alerting human drivers to when road conditions are unsuitable for
autonomous driving, and more importantly, of educating drivers to take heed of such safety
alerts. See Rachel Abrams & Annalyn Kurtz, Joshua Brown, Who Died in Self-Driving Acci-
dent, Tested Limits of His Tesla, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/
02/business/joshua-brown-technology-enthusiast-tested-the-limits-of-his-tesla.html.
33. “GM’s monitoring system has facial recognition software that can detect if a driver
is falling asleep or not paying attention . . . If so, the system issues alerts: a red visual display
telling a driver to take control followed by a seat vibration and then a recorded audio message.
If drivers ignore all those, GM’s OnStar system will communicate with the driver.” David
Shepardson, U.S. letter reveals details of GM self-driving vehicle system, REUTERS (Nov. 28,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-selfdriving-idUSKBN13N2CY.
34. Adrienne Lafrance, How Self-Driving Cars Will Threaten Privacy, ATLANTIC (Mar.
21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/self-driving-cars-and-the-
looming-privacy-apocalypse/474600/.
35. Ellen P. Goodman, Self-driving cars: overlooking data privacy is a car crash wait-
ing to happen, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/
08/self-driving-car-legislation-drones-data-security.
36. Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars—Oh My! First
Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 665
(2015), h8p://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol16/iss2/3.
37. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S. (2012); See also Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. (2014).
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creating digital forensic proof when accidents occur, for legal and insurance
purposes.38 ACV jailbreakers could theoretically disable this feature, al-
lowing one to wipe this type of evidence.
In the context of TNCs and publicly or privately operated fleets of con-
nected vehicles – assuming that individually owned vehicles could join
fleets or “platoons”39 – jailbreaking could allow for “queue prioritization”. A
jailbroken ACV would be able to join a platoon or somehow gain an unfair
advantage when joining a network, prioritizing itself over other ACVs.
One incentive stems from an ACV manufacturer preventing the vehicle
from being used as part of a third-party TNC (i.e. a fleet, discussed supra).
Indeed, Tesla Motors has announced that their full self-driving capability
will be available to consumers only on the condition that “using a self-driv-
ing Tesla for car sharing and ride hailing . . . for revenue purposes will only
be permissible on the Tesla Network.”40  This is a classic example of impos-
ing Digital Rights Management (DRM) onto vehicle software. In electronics
and software, DRM is an oft-cited reason for circumvention, and the legality
of such circumvention is governed by the copyright system.
Another incentive to jailbreak would be to have control over OEM
software updates. Some end-users might balk at an OEM’s “permission-less
innovation”, and be skeptical at their deployment of new services and appli-
cations. In the smartphone jailbreaking context, this often occurs because
certain software updates create incompatibilities with older applications that
end-users still want access to.
Perhaps the most intriguing (and terrifying) reason to jailbreak an ACV
is to modify “crash-optimization algorithms”.41 Such algorithms are the way
OEM’s would determine who or what an ACV would hit if presented with a
no-win or catch-22 scenario.42 This obviously leads to weighty ethical and
38. See e.g., Cal. Veh. Code § 38750(c)(1)(G) (2014).
39. “Platooning” is a transportation system that “links vehicles in a high-efficiency
group, [bumper-to-bumper] like a train without the train tracks”. Stephen Shankland, Platoon-
ing: The Future of Freeways is Lining Up, CNET (Sept. 3, 2013, 8:44 AM), https://www.cnet
.com/news/platooning-the-future-of-freeways-is-lining-up/.
40. Jonathan Gitlin, Don’t Plan on Using Your Autonomous Tesla to Earn money With
Uber or Lyft, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 20, 2016, 8:47 AM), http://arstechnica.com/cars/2016/10/
dont-plan-on-using-an-autonomous-tesla-to-earn-money-with-uber-or-lyft/.
41. See Jeffrey K. Gurney, Crashing into the Unknown: An Examination of Crash-Op-
timization Algorithms Through the Two Lanes of Ethics and Law, 79 ALBANY LAW REVIEW
83, 185-86 (2016).
42. See id. at 186. (citing Robot Ethics: Morals and the Machine, ECONOMIST (June 2,
2012), http://www.economist.com/ node/21556234 (“[A]utonomous machines are bound to
end up making life- or-death decisions in unpredictable situations.”); The Robot Car of To-
morrow, supra note 5 (“Some road accidents are unavoidable, and even autonomous cars can’t
escape that fate.”); Jason Millar, An Ethical Dilemma: When Robot Cars Must Kill, Who
Should Pick the Victim?, ROBOHUB (June 11, 2014), http://robohub.org/an-ethical-dilemma-
when-robot-cars-must-kill-who- should-pick-the-victim/ (“We are moving closer to having
driverless cars on roads everywhere, and naturally, people are starting to wonder what kinds of
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legal implications.43 A jailbroken ACV could theoretically override these al-
gorithms, prioritizing the lives of vehicle occupants over those in harm’s
way.44
C. Automotive Electronics and Circumvention
  The electronic innards of motor vehicles have been roughly the same for
several decades.45 Most mechanical components in a modern automobile
have embedded electronic control units (“ECUs”) that govern their operation
and connect them to the rest of a vehicle’s systems and subsystems.46 ECUs
communicate with one another via a controller area network (CAN).47 This
creates a type of “thinking nervous system” that can function without a cen-
tralized “brain”. This eliminates the need for a central host computer to coor-
dinate all operations, as each ECU is able to input and output data to other
ECUs and function accordingly.48 Jailbreaking cannot take place under this
type of system.
ACVs differ from this paradigm of automotive electronics because they
must include some type of central computer that coordinates all the activities
of a vehicle’s various subsystems. Such a computer requires a centralized
software “brain” to execute autonomous functions.49 This is the vehicle op-
ethical challenges driverless cars will pose. One of those challenges is choosing how a driver-
less car should react when faced with an unavoidable crash scenario.”).
43. See id. at 185. (citing Patrick Lin, Why Ethics Matters for Autonomous Cars, in
AUTONOMES FAHREN 69, 72 (2015) (stating that society will want autonomous vehicles to
minimize harm when faced with an unavoidable accident).
44. See Kelsey D. Atherton, MIT Game Asks Who Driverless Cars Should Kill, Popular
Sci. (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.popsci.com/mit-game-asks-who-driverless-cars-should-kill.
(According to an ongoing experiment conducted by M.I.T., dubbed “The Moral Machine,”
public opinion is split on whether to prioritize a passenger or pedestrian in such scenarios).
45. WILLIAM B. RIBBENS, UNDERSTANDING AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS 3 (6th ed. 2003)
(Electronics embedded into automotive components started in the 1970s, when “the introduc-
tion of government regulations for exhaust emissions and fuel economy” necessitated better
control of the engine than was possible with existing methods, and with “the development of
relatively low cost per function solid-state digital electronics.”).
46. See NAT’L INSTRUMENTS WHITE PAPER, ECU Designing and Testing using National
Instruments Products, (Nov. 7, 2009), http://www.ni.com/white-paper/3312/en/ (explaining
that ECUs are the “brain” of each component they are embedded onto – receiving real-world
data via sensors, holding that data in memory and processing it based on logic, and manipulat-
ing the component’s actuators (i.e., valves, motors, etc.)).
47. NAT’L INSTRUMENTS WHITE PAPER, Controller Area Network (CAN) Overview
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.ni.com/white-paper/2732/en/.
48. ECU and CAN circumvention have traditionally been used to override a vehicle’s
default speed limit, pollution control limits, tweak engine and/or turbocharger performance,
manipulate dashboard indicators, and extend infotainment functionality, among other
purposes.
49. Glancy, supra at note 37, at 639 (citing INT’L TRANSP. FORUM, ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., AUTOMATED AND AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: REGULATION UNDER UN-
CERTAINTY 11-12 (2015), http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/pub/pdf/15CPB_Autono
mousDriving.pdf; NAT’L SCI. FOUND., Programming Safety into Self-Driving Cars, (Feb. 2,
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erating system, built atop the existing ECU/CAN architecture, which creates
the “surface” through which a jailbreak will penetrate. Within milliseconds,
this brain receives the sensor and actuator data from mechanical compo-
nents, makes decisions, and executes commands back to those parts.50
Some companies, like Tesla Motors, have already created their own ve-
hicle operating system (based on the Ubuntu Linux platform).51 This operat-
ing system is essentially no different than the ones that operate on desktop
computers and mobile devices.52
The Tesla architecture is highly relevant because it has already been
jailbroken, and a minor controversy occurred as a result.53 A curious owner
in France was able to gain access to the vehicle operating system and shared
his methods on an online enthusiast forum.54 The press used the very term
‘jailbreaking’ when reporting on the circumvention.55 The owner later re-
ported that the company found out about his circumvention and contacted
him, threatening to void his warranty if he did not cease his activities. The
owner never reported any follow-ups by Tesla, other than the initial censure.
2015), http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=134033&org=IIS (introducing
algorithms designed to incorporate adequate safety controls in semi-autonomous vehicles))
(“An autonomous car will rely on highly sophisticated computer processing to integrate and
analyze internal vehicle operational data and roadway sensor data and then to determine which
automated controls to activate and trigger them. Artificial intelligence integrates internal vehi-
cle operational and external roadway environment inputs.”).
50. James Morra, NXP Builds Computer Engine for Self-Driving Cars, ELECTRONIC DE-
SIGN (May 17, 2016), http://electronicdesign.com/microprocessors/nxp-builds-computer-en-
gine-self-driving-cars (describing the BlueBox autonomous vehicle platform as “a central
computer engine fueled by the bits streaming in from sensors around the vehicle. It knits
together all the different sensors found in autonomous cars, including radars, cameras, and
Lidar systems.”).
51. Nikki Gordon-Bloomfield, Owners Hack Tesla Model S Electric Car: Tesla Politely
Asks Them to Stop, TRANSPORT EVOLVED (Apr. 8, 2014), https://transportevolved.com/2014/
04/08/owners-hack-tesla-model-s-electronic-car-tesla-politely-asks-stop/ (“Ubuntu Under the
Hood . . . Those who have looked claim the Model S’ operating system seems to be based on a
special variant of Ubuntu, a Debian-based Linux operating system.”).
52. Jason Torchinsky, The Tesla Model S Is Basically a Good Looking IT Department
on Wheels, JALOPNIK (Apr. 4, 2014), http://jalopnik.com/the-tesla-model-s-is-basically-a-good-
looking-it-depart-1558372928 (“It’s really odd just how, well, normal all this feels — it’s just
like any home or office network. They’re using it in some interesting ways — for example, the
current song playing artwork is being served to the center large display simply like normal
web traffic . . . He even managed to get Firefox running on both the center screen and the dash
cluster screen.”).
53. Tesla Model S Ethernet Network Explored, Possible Jailbreak in the Future?,
DRAGTIMES (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.dragtimes.com/blog/tesla-model-s-ethernet-network-
explored-possible-jailbreak-in-the-future (“All of this technology certain [sic] brings up the
question as to when and if Tesla’s internal systems will be hacked and jailbroken to allow 3rd
party applications to run on the large 17? touchscreen.”); Torchinsky, supra note 52.
54. nlc, Successful Connection on the Model S Internal Ethernet Network, TESLA MO-
TORS FORUM (Mar. 2, 2014), https://teslamotorsclub.com/tmc/threads/successful-connection-
on-the-model-s-internal-ethernet-network.28185/#post-595400.
55. E.g., Torchinsky, supra note 53.
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This indicates how ACV makers could posture similarly to smartphone mak-
ers when it comes to jailbreaking – namely that companies make veiled
threats to void warranties or similar contractual invocations.
More recently, an ACV startup has decided to open source its vehicle
operating system56, which would allow drivers to load their own custom au-
tonomous driving software without having to circumvent an existing sys-
tem.57 These open source alternatives demonstrate not only that vehicle
operating systems are becoming commonplace, but that third-party alterna-
tives are collaboratively developed and shared widely.
III. COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
  The legality of circumventing digital products is determined by an intellec-
tual property regime, Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
ACV jailbreaks fall under this law, and those involved in jailbreaking could
thus incur civil and criminal liability, barring a special exemption permitting
certain cases of circumvention for the public interest. The pursuit of legal
action is at the discretion of ACV companies, the outcome of which is likely
to vary widely due to the courts’ lack of a uniform interpretation of the
statute. It is also possible that Section 1201 may be overturned entirely by
the time ACVs are widespread.
As mentioned previously, ACVs jailbreaks are a type of software
circumvention, and since software code is copyrightable, their legali-
ty is governed by copyright law,58 including the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”).59 For this reason, those who develop60, distrib-
56. Tim Higgins, George Hotz’s Startup Gives Away Semiautonomous-Driving
Software, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/george-hotzs-startup-
gives-away-semiautonomous-driving-software-1480548039.
57. The open source ACV OS can be found at https://github.com/commaai/openpilot.
The developer describes its capabilities as “perform[ing] the functions of Adaptive Cruise
Control (ACC) and Lane Keeping Assist System (LKAS) for Hondas and Acuras. It’s about on
par with Tesla Autopilot at launch, and better than all other manufacturers.”
58. The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976) (The Copyright Act treats
software code as a literary work, which is protected under 17 U.S.C. § 102, granting protection
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.”).
59. See OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, Prosecuting Intellec-
tual Property Crimes 235 (4th ed. 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/03/26/prosecuting_ip_crimes_manual_2013.pdf (“Congress intended Title I
of the DMCA to apply to copyrighted works that are in digital format and thus could easily
and inexpensively be accessed, reproduced, and distributed over the Internet without the copy-
right owner’s authorization.”) [hereinafter Prosecuting IP Crimes].
60. Jailbreak developers are typically product enthusiasts with the requisite skills in
software development and automotive electronics. See Yukari Iwatani Kane, The iPhone 3GS
Hacking Debate, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2009, 9:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/07/06/
the-iphone-3gs-hacking-debate/ (discussing how early iPhone jailbreaks were developed by
“the iPhone Dev Team, a loose-knit but exclusive group of highly-skilled technologists.”).
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ute61, install62, or use an ACV jailbreak, barring a statutory exemption,
would infringe the software copyright of ACV manufacturers and/or
suppliers.
A. DMCA § 1201
  DMCA Section 1201(a), otherwise known as the “anti-circumvention pro-
vision”, applies to two variants of “digital lock” technology: access-control
measures (“ACMs”) and copy-control measure (“CCMs”), collectively
known as TPMs.63 ACMs limit access to protected works using such con-
trols as passwords and encryption, while CCMs limit the ability for users to
copy said works after they have already gained access to them. Section 1201
expressly prohibits the circumvention of ACMs, but not of CCMs. Since
jailbreaking circumvents the ACV manufacturer’s “digital lock” on the oper-
ating system, those who develop, distribute, install, or use an ACV jailbreak
would infringe Section 1201.
The law does not stop at prohibiting the creation and use of circumven-
tion tools — it also prohibits the trafficking of them, regardless of whether
such tools lead another party to circumvent an ACM or CCM.64 These so-
called “anti-trafficking provisions” make it illegal to traffic in both ACMs
and CCMs, even though actual circumvention of CCMs is permitted.65
ACV jailbreaks would violate these provisions outright, because they
would necessitate circumventing an ACV’s ACMs and CCMs, which is ex-
actly what Section 1201 addresses. In addition, the marketing and distribu-
tion of such circumventions (“trafficking”, per the statute’s language) would
also plainly violate this law. It is only by statutory exemption that ACV
jailbreaks might pass muster.
61. In most instances, jailbreaks are not created for commercial gain, and are often part
of an open-source development project in which anyone can contribute to the freely available
codebase. See John Koetsier, Jailbreaking iOS 7: A crowdfunded ‘device freedom prize’ for
the first open source exploit, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://venturebeat.com/
2013/12/04/jailbreaking-apples-ios-7-now-theres-a-crowdfunded-device-freedom-prize-for-
the-first-open-source-exploit/ (quoting the Device Freedom Prize group, “We strongly believe
that users should have the freedom to control their devices . . . We want an open source
jailbreak for iOS 7.”).
62. See, e.g., US Copyright Office Study: Software-Enabled Consumer Products, at Fn.
173: Auto Care Ass’n Initial Comments at 5 (stating that “vehicle parts manufacturers and
servicers have been sued and threatened with suit for copyright infringement merely for engag-
ing in repairs of software-controlled parts”); see also Tr. at 49:04-10 (May 18, 2016) (Shaun
Bockert, Dorman Products, Inc.) (referencing lawsuit involving Dorman, see Am. Compl. and
Jury Demand, General Motors LLC v. Dorman Prods., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-12917 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 18, 2015)).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) and 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(2).
64. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640 (8th Cir. 2005); See also Uni-
versal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440-41 (2nd Cir. 2001).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) and 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).
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Since Section 1201 enables copyright owners to lock down devices to
support only certain software, services, and geographic regions, it is often
blamed for stifling “both innovation and [aftermarket] competition in tech-
nology and entertainment markets”, as well as limiting free expression, jeop-
ardizing fair use, and impeding security research.66 The market for ACVs
and their software is no exception. But Congress wanted to ensure that the
general public has the tools to make fair and non-infringing uses of copy-
righted works, while the making of infringing copies of a work are already
addressed in other areas of U.S. copyright law.67 Thus, the Library of Con-
gress (“Library”) grants exemptions for certain categories of circumvention
that are found to be in the public interest.68 ACV jailbreaks may potentially
be granted such an exemption.
B. Statutory Exemptions
  The Section 1201 rulemaking process was designed to place the DMCA
“in accord with the constitutional directive of the Copyright Clause and fair
use doctrine codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107.”69 It is a mechanism that aims to
reconcile the competing interests of copyright holders and the general pub-
lic, namely ordinary consumers, educators, researchers, and competitors.70
These interests have been at the heart of the smartphone jailbreaking debate,
and would be weighed similarly in a determination of an exemption for
ACV jailbreaks.
The triennial rulemaking “is a highly visible and public process, com-
menced every three years”. Members of the public propose potential exemp-
tions, and they are evaluated through “several rounds of public notices,
written comments, and public hearings. The Librarian of Congress then
adopts exemptions based upon the recommendation of the Register of Copy-
rights—who in turn receives input from the public and from the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”).”71
1. “Lawful modification”
  In October of 2015, after an exhaustive notice and comment period over-
seen by the Register of Copyrights (“Register”), the Library granted exemp-
tions (“2015 Exemptions”) for the circumvention of “motorized land vehicle
66. Maryna Koberidze, The DMCA Rulemaking Mechanism: Fail or Safe?, 11 WASH. J.
L. TECH. & ARTS 211, 224 (Fall 2015) (citing S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998)).
67. Id. at 230
68. Id. at 227.
69. Id. at 228.
70. Exemptions are valid for only three years. At the start of each rulemaking cycle, the
public is invited to submit proposals to the Register of Copyrights, who then hosts a process of
hearings and public comments, after which the final rule is put forward by the Register and
issued by the Librarian of Congress.
71. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., Understanding the Section 1201 Rulemaking, at 1, https://
www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/2015_1201_FAQ_final.pdf.
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[software]” for the purposes of “lawful modification” and “good-faith secur-
ity research.”72 These provisions are critical to understanding future exemp-
tions potentially granted for ACV jailbreaks. Proponents included the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) and the Intellectual Property &
Technology Law Clinic of the University of Southern California Gould
School of Law. It was opposed by the Alliance of Automobile Manufactur-
ers, Association of Global Automakers, Eaton Corp., General Motors, John
Deere, and the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association.
The first exemption is for “lawful modification”, justified as a non-in-
fringing activity and as a matter of fair use, specifically for,
“Computer programs that are contained in [ECUs] and control the
functioning of a motorized land vehicle such as a personal automo-
bile [or] commercial motor vehicle, except for computer programs
primarily designed for the control of telematics or entertainment
systems for such vehicle, when circumvention is a necessary step
undertaken by the authorized owner of the vehicle to allow the diag-
nosis, repair or lawful modification of a vehicle function;73 and
where such circumvention does not constitute a violation of applica-
ble law, including without limitation regulations promulgated by the
Department of Transportation or the Environmental Protection
Agency. . .”.74
Proponents wanted the rule to allow for “aftermarket personalization, modi-
fication, or other improvement . . . such as enhancing a vehicle’s suspension
or installing a gear with a different radius”, but this was rejected in the final
rule.75 This is indicative of the Library’s view of automotive software cir-
cumvention, namely that it should only be allowed for a very narrow set of
circumstances (as is enumerated in the final rule). For example, telematics
and entertainment systems were specifically excluded from the exemption.
Based on this ruling, we can extrapolate that any proposal for ACV jail-
breaking would likely be rejected, and for two key reasons.
First, a jailbreak would allow for too broad a range of activities, falling
outside the narrow scope of purposes the current exemptions accommodate.
It is one thing to circumvent a few ECUs related to a specific repair or
research objective, it is another to circumvent a whole-car OS, granting ac-
cess to all functions. Jailbreaking allows for such frivolous capabilities as
72. See, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,955 (Oct. 28, 2015) (37 C.F.R. § 201.40),
http://federalregister.gov/a/2015-27212 [hereinafter “2015 Exemptions”].
73. Opponents to this exemption argued that it “would not facilitate non-infringing uses,
and was unnecessary in any event because vehicle owners have alternative options, such as
manufacturer-authorized repair shops and tools.” Id. at 28.
74. Id.
75. 2015 Exemptions, supra note 72, at 65956.
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programming the ACV to execute “donuts” without requiring human control
(which tends to be difficult for an average driver to perform).76
Second, while the current exemption acknowledges the safety risks in-
herent in the circumvention of motor vehicles (specifying that “security re-
search must be conducted in a controlled setting designed to avoid harm to
individuals or the public”), these risks would not compare to those presented
by ACV circumvention.77
Probing the question not through the vehicles exemption but through the
smartphone jailbreaking exemption (which was granted for the third cycle in
a row), the analysis is still not favorable to ACV jailbreaking. The set of
activities enabled by smartphone jailbreaking is seen as beneficial to its
users with little to no risk of harm posed to others. But the set of activities
enabled by ACV jailbreaking and the concomitant harms that could arise
would likely be too great for a future Library administration to support.
Also crucial to note is the carve-out for telematics or entertainment sys-
tems. As discussed earlier, these systems are often the crux of an automotive
circumvention, as demonstrated by the 2014 Jeep Hack and similar exam-
ples.78 However, the Register did not cite that as a concern in her reasoning.
She concluded that there was “insufficient evidence demonstrating a need to
access such [entertainment and telematics] ECUs”, and that “such circum-
vention might enable unauthorized access to creative or proprietary con-
tent.”79 Prioritizing content infringement concerns over safety or security
concerns appears odd, and is perhaps a single ray of hope for ACV jailbreak-
ing to be exempted in the future, so long as it somehow “distracts” the Reg-
ister with other concerns, as occurred here.
The views of the opposition (namely that of automakers, suppliers, and
other government agencies) are instructive on the issue of safety. Their posi-
tion is described by the Register below:
“The agencies’ concerns were focused on potential adverse effects
on safety and the environment. For example, EPA explained that
vehicle modifications are often performed to increase engine power
76. A “donut” is a vehicular stunt whereby a driver rotates either the front or rear
wheels around the polar set of wheels in a continuous motion, leaving concentric circular skid-
marks on a roadway.
77. 2015 Exemptions, supra note 72, at 65,956.
78. See Charlie Miller & Chris Valasek, A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Sur-
faces, ILLMATICS 15-20, http://illmatics.com/remote%20attack%20surfaces.pdf; See also Andy
Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED (July 21,
2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/all/1 (“Their code
is an automaker’s nightmare: software that lets hackers send commands through the Jeep’s
entertainment system to its dashboard functions, steering, brakes, and transmission, all from a
laptop that may be across the country.”).
79. 2015 Exemptions, supra note 72, at 65,956.
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or boost fuel economy, but that these modifications increase vehicle
emissions and thus violate the Clean Air Act.”80
This was a significant sticking point in the 2015 rulemaking process, and
there was a high level of crosstalk between the Library and these agencies to
settle the issue.81 From this we can infer that any future rulemaking around
ACV jailbreaking would necessarily involve relevant agencies such as the
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), outside of any other enforcement issue discussed further in
this paper.82
2. “Good-faith security research”
  The second of the relevant 2015 Exemptions permits “good-faith security
research”, specifically,
“for purposes of good-faith testing, investigation and/or correction
of a security flaw or vulnerability, when such activity is carried out
in a controlled environment designed to avoid any harm to individu-
als or the public, and where the information derived from the activ-
ity is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of
devices or machines on which the computer program operates, or
those who use such devices or machines, and is not used or main-
tained in a manner that facilitates copyright infringement.”83
The automotive industry vehemently and unsuccessfully opposed this ex-
emption, citing the malicious use of such research by “bad actors” to hack
into vehicles. But the interest in security research outweighed the downsides,
with the Register finding that “legitimate security research has been hin-
dered by TPMs that limit access to those programs.”84
The Register went on to articulate two other significant issues with the
security research exemption: the application of research findings and the
proper treatment of their disclosure. In the first instance, it was acknowl-
edged that “the interests of the manufacturer and the public may both be
affected by the nature and timing of disclosure of software flaws”.85 In the
second, it was acknowledged that “. . .information derived from the research
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. There is no reason to believe otherwise – EPA’s concerns were unequivocally vali-
dated when over one month before the 2015 Exemptions were granted, a massive scandal
erupted over Volkswagen admitting that 11 million of its vehicles “were equipped with
software that was used to cheat on emissions tests.” See Gates, et al., Explaining Volkswagen’s
Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/
business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html.
83. 2015 Exemptions, supra note 72, at 65956.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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activity be used primarily to promote the security or safety of the devices
containing the computer programs on which the research is conducted, or of
those who use those devices.”86 These are important provisions, and ones
that make sense for today’s vehicles and ACVs in the future.
Applying the security research exemption to ACV circumvention would
be theoretically possible under the justification that a large amount of ACV
research and testing takes place in designated secure settings (either private
corporate facilities or those of educational institutions), and is conducted by
avid professionals that would properly disclose flaws.87 Since ACVs neces-
sarily require whole-car OSs, circumvention technology may be exempted
for this narrowly tailored use. This of course says nothing of consumer in-
stallations of jailbreaks, which would presumably be prohibited under any
scenario.
3. Returning to the 2015 Exemptions’ smartphone jailbreaking provision,
the Library exempted
“Computer programs that enable smartphones . . . to execute law-
fully obtained software applications, where circumvention is ac-
complished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such
applications with computer programs on the smartphone or device,
or to permit removal of software from the smartphone or device.”88
This is sensible for the fragmented world of smartphones and cellular net-
works, but is it for the world of ACVs? We know that connected vehicles
will function similarly to smartphones and cellular networks, with manufac-
turers enabling connectivity between their own vehicles (or to allied manu-
facturers’ vehicles) and to roadway infrastructure, but it is not necessarily
the case that all vehicles in the U.S. fleet will connect with one another.89
ACV jailbreaks could enable such interoperability, as jailbreaks do for
smartphones, and that logic leans in favor of a narrowly tailored ACV jail-
break exemption. Whether such jailbreaks could be “lawfully obtained” is a
separate question, and one that is unlikely to weigh in favor of this category
of circumvention.
Jailbreaking of any machine or device for purposes other than those per-
mitted by the 2015 Exemptions would immediately trigger the liability enu-
merated in DMCA §1201, which carries civil and criminal penalties. Given
86. Id.
87. The University of Michigan contains one such facility, the Mobility Transformation
Center, whose homepage may be found at M City, http://www.mtc.umich.edu/.
88. 2015 Exemptions, supra note 72, at 65953.
89. One such “alliance” is the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (“CAMP”), a part-
nership between Mercedes-Benz, General Motors, Toyota, Nissan, Volkswagen, Hyundai-Kia
Motors, Honda, and Ford. See Rachel King, Automakers Tackle the Massive Security Chal-
lenges of Connected Vehicles, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/06/
25/automakers-tackle-the-massive-security-challenges-of-connected-vehicles/.
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the nature of the 2015 Exemptions, specifically around motor vehicles, it is
unlikely for ACV jailbreaks to be granted an exemption in the future, except
perhaps for the narrowly tailored purpose of private security research and
interoperability.
C. Civil and Criminal Ramifications
  In the absence of a Section 1201 exemption, ACV jailbreaks will incur
infringement liability. The statute provides civil remedies to copyright hold-
ers who may at their discretion choose to litigate under the statutory right of
action against unwanted circumvention of their works.90 It also creates crim-
inal offenses and penalties to be prosecuted at the discretion of the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”).91
In civil actions, damages constitute both “actual damages suffered by
the party as a result of the violation” as well as “any additional profits of the
violator”.92 Statutory damages are also available to plaintiffs.
In criminal cases, penalties are not trivial, with fines up to $500,000 or
imprisonment for up to 5 years, for the first offense.93 It only gets worse
from there. However, educational institutions like the ACV research facili-
ties discussed above are exempted from these offenses.
Criminal actions require the government to establish that the defendant
willfully circumvented an ACM of a copyrighted work for “commercial ad-
vantage or private financial gain.”94 The type of harm that ACV jailbreaks
could potentially cause (to persons or property) is not addressed in the crimi-
nal liability section of the statute, leaving that to judicial interpretation or for
a separate liability regime. Regardless, an ACV jailbreak is no different than
any other circumvention discussed in the DMCA, and barring an exemption
would still constitute a criminal offense regardless of the potential for harm
to persons or property.
D. Discretion to Litigate
  It is at the discretion of copyright holders to pursue action against an
alleged circumventor. In some instances, copyright holders choose not to file
suit, as is the case with Apple, Inc.’s treatment of the development commu-
90. “Any person injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action
in an appropriate United States district court for such violation.” 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2017).
Courts have the power to “grant temporary and permanent injunctions,” “order the im-
pounding . . . of any device or product that is in the custody or control of the alleged violator
and that the court has reasonable cause to believe was involved in a violation,” “allow the
recovery of costs by or against any party,” and “order the remedial modification or the destruc-
tion of any device or product involved in the violation.” 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2017).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2017).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(1) (2017).
93. The first case where the DOJ prosecuted a defendant for §1201 violations was U.S.
v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
94. Prosecuting IP Crime, supra note 59, at 326.
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nity that for years has been jailbreaking the iPhone’s iOS operating system.95
Despite being in a constant arms race with these circumventors, they have
turned a blind eye and never legally threatened them.
There are many reasons for this, of which the same would apply to ACV
jailbreaking. First, through the process of developing a circumvention, jail-
breaking communities indirectly assist with the detection of bugs. As is the
case in unofficial cybersecurity research, the goodwill of these communities
often leads to good faith disclosures to manufacturers.96 As mentioned ear-
lier, Apple has even thanked jailbreakers (in the release notes of a software
update) for finding a bug in iOS. Given the heavily software-driven nature of
ACVs, detection and disclosure of such security vulnerabilities would serve
an important function.97
Second, because courts have been unpredictable in their application of
DMCA §1201, companies may be hesitant to pursue capricious litigation,
which drains time and resources and could lead to negative legal precedent.98
Third, companies must weigh the potential adverse publicity or perception of
anticompetitive behavior that would likely result from litigation.99 There is
also a societal conception of “ownership” over a consumer product that
would be violated, leading to further negative publicity.100 A company in the
automotive industry—an industry core to the nation’s sense of pride and
whose products are a daily fixture of peoples’ lives—would feel the reputa-
tional consequences arising out of litigation against their own enthusiasts.
Another incentive for ACV manufacturers to turn a blind eye is to in-
crease customer satisfaction and perhaps capture new customers. Customers
in this market will want access to newer software-enabled features, but it
might be the case that even though official over-the-air software upgrades
can technically deliver these improvements, they might not be distributable
95. See Yoney, supra note 27.
96. Indeed, this is already starting to happen in the automotive sphere, thanks to the
2015 DMCA Exemptions. Andy Greenberg, It’s Finally Legal To Hac, Your Own Devices
(Even Your Car), WIRED (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/hacking-car-pace-
maker-toaster-just-became-legal/all/1 (“Since [General Motors] launched a vulnerability dis-
closure program in January that offered some assurance it wouldn’t sue helpful hackers, it’s
received hundreds of reports of security vulnerabilities in its cars.”).
97. This is very common in the information technology arena. See U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., Software-Enabled Consumer Products at 42-45 (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.copyright
.gov/policy/software/software-full-report.pdf. “For example, Google has offered a ‘Vulnerabil-
ity Reward Program’ since 2010 to encourage security researchers to identify technical vulner-
abilities in its system, and it offers $500 to $100,000 for researchers who identify qualifying
bugs through its ‘Chrome Reward Program.’ Other companies such as Facebook, Microsoft,
and Mozilla offer similar security research rewards programs.” Id. at 45.
98. See Eric Stevens, Fair Competition or Unlawful Circumvention?: The DMCA and
Product Aftermarkets, FOR THE DEFENSE at 53 (Jan. 2016), http://www.poynerspruill.com/pub-
lications/Documents/FTD-1601-Stevens.pdf.
99. Id. at 56.
100. Id.
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due to pending regulatory approval. Permitting jailbreaks allows customers
to access new features without the manufacturer running afoul of
regulations.101
Conversely, there are plenty of reasons for ACV manufacturers and/or
suppliers to move forward with assertive enforcement actions, chiefly that of
deterring circumventions that could potentially lead to serious harms. A jail-
broken smartphone, outside of damaging itself, cannot cause extrinsic harm.
In contrast, an accident caused by a jailbroken ACV could lead to property
damage, personal injury, or death. It might even be the case that ACV manu-
facturers and/or suppliers are imposed some type of duty to enforce Section
1201.
E. Common Law Interpretations
  In the seventeen years since the DMCA was enacted, there has yet to be an
overarching common law interpretation of Section 1201. Some cases have
been very favorable toward copyright holders, and others have treated them
less so. Some have entertained First Amendment challenges to the claims,
and others have discarded them outright. Like the rest of U.S. copyright law,
the result is a hodgepodge of rulings that are difficult if not impossible to
reconcile.
1. Cases at the Northern District of California
  The Northern District of California is home to numerous technology com-
panies, and thus has hosted many of the important cases in this area of the
law. But even within this single jurisdiction, there are conflicting interpreta-
tions. In 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. (2004), the court
ruled that DVD copying software violated § 1201. It further concluded that
the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA were constitutional. The
court ruled similarly in another DVD copying software case, Realnetworks,
Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. (2009). While useful in establishing
the inconsistency of rulings between the Northern District versus other juris-
dictions, these cases differ factually from ACV circumvention. DVD copy-
ing concerns unauthorized duplication, not the modification of operating
systems to expose unauthorized functionality.
The same court, however, issued a mere slap on the wrist in a case much
more germane to ACV jailbreaking. Sony Computer Entertainment America,
Inc. v. Hotz (2011). There, a hacking group circumvented the Sony PlaySta-
tion video game console’s TPMs to jailbreak the operating system. The
modified OS enabled new functionality such as backing up games for dis-
kless play, playing pirated games, the support of different video formats, and
the ability to run other software and applications. The case ended in a tem-
porary restraining order that forbade defendants from distributing the jail-
101. See Stewart, supra note 28.
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break, helping or encouraging others to jailbreak, and trafficking the
information they learned during their circumvention.
The court was also favorable to the defendant in United States v. Elcom,
Ltd. and Dmitry Sklyarov (N.D. Cal. 2002), a case famous for being the
DOJ’s first criminal prosecution of an individual §1201 defendant. There,
Sklyarov sold software that removed restrictions from Adobe Portable Docu-
ment Format (“PDF”) files, such that users could freely download, read, and
archive PDF-protected eBooks. The charges were dropped and Sklyarov and
Elcomsoft were found not guilty. This case is more akin to the DVD copying
cases in that the circumvention was not designed to expose additional func-
tionality of a software program.
2. Cases Elsewhere in the Country
  At the Ninth Circuit, mixed results were shown when the court in MDY
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) ruled in favor
of defendants for both ACM circumvention and trafficking claims but not
for a separate ACM circumvention claim. There, a company was sued for
creating an application that allowed the players of a video game to automate
playing the game to level-up players’ characters. This case does not bear
directly on ACV jailbreaking, since it is only about a software circumven-
tion that hastens the arrival of features that are already available if one plays
the levels of the game.
In another major case heard in Illinois, Agfa Monotype Corp. v. Adobe
Systems, Inc. (N.D. Illinois 2005), the defendants enjoyed a favorable out-
come over their circumvention of copyrighted fonts embedded in PDF files.
There, the court held that defendant did not violate the DMCA because the
TPM did not effectively control access to the fonts. Again, this case is useful
in explaining the chaotic DMCA rulings across the nation, but bears little on
ACV jailbreaking.
Meanwhile, defendants were treated fairly in another seminal case heard
at the Federal Circuit, Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.
(2004).102 There, creators of a universal transmitter for garage doors circum-
vented a manufacturer’s “rolling code” so that transmitters could be used
across a variety of doors. Defendants were held not to have violated § 1201.
The Federal Circuit decision is in stark contrast to New York, where courts
that have heard some of the largest cases in this area of law have repeatedly
ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley (2nd Cir. 2001). In
the Universal cases, the court held that creators and distributors of DeCSS
102. The Federal Circuit is supposed to hear only patent cases, but sometimes these cases
have copyright claims that ride along, bringing copyright cases into their jurisdiction as well,
which has led to circuit splits in other areas of copyright law. Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. Law 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (Apr. 2, 1982), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STAT-
UTE-96/pdf/STATUTE-96-Pg25.pdf.
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(DVD decryption software) violated the DMCA, which was “content-neutral
as applied to computer programs”.103 It also held that the defendants’ First
Amendment rights were not violated by the statute.104 Again, these cases are
relevant due to their role in shaping anti-circumvention law, but do not bear
on ACV jailbreaking directly.
It is clear that civil action against ACV jailbreaks will produce widely
differing outcomes depending on the jurisdiction. In California, courts will
likely rule in favor of jailbreaker(s), or to at least rule favorably for some of
the claims. Meanwhile, in New York, courts are more likely to rule in favor
of plaintiffs. And yet if a suit were brought before the Federal Circuit, it
could be a different outcome. Only one jurisdiction has heard a case that
bears directly on operating system jailbreaking (N.D. Cal. and the Sony
PlayStation case), and it is thus difficult to say how another jurisdiction
would treat a case with similar facts, other than how they’ve ruled on other
anti-circumvention cases.
Geography alone is not dispositive to these types of cases, as courts
have examined a variety of defenses, which include the following: (1) Li-
brary of Congress exemptions; (2) statutory carve-outs for certain nonprofit
entities, information security purposes, reverse engineering and technology
interoperability, security and encryption research, restriction of minors’ ac-
cess to the Internet, and protection of personally identifying information; (3)
First Amendment freedom of express (“chilling effects”) challenges based
on either “facial” or “as applied” arguments; (4) Fifth Amendment vague-
ness challenges; and (5) the fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act.105
F. Challenge to § 1201
  Regardless of statutory and judicial interpretations of ACV jailbreaking
under Section 1201, it is also possible that by the time ACVs are wide-
spread, the statute will be overturned. Since its inception, cases have chal-
lenged its constitutionality on First Amendment grounds, but the statute still
stands. This is changing now, with the Electronic Frontier Foundation
launching a new First Amendment freedom of expression suit against the
U.S. government on behalf of technologists and researchers to overturn Sec-
tion 1201.106 EFF argues that “the prospect of costly legal battles or criminal
prosecution stymies creators, academics, inventors, and researchers . . . Sec-
103. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, at 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)
104. Id. at 346.
105. See Prosecuting IP Crimes, supra note 59, at 263-79.
106. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND, EFF Lawsuit Takes on DMCA Section 1201: Re-
search and Technology Restrictions Violate the First Amendment (July 21, 2016), https://www
.eff.org/press/releases/eff-lawsuit-takes-dmca-section-1201-research-and-technology-restric-
tions-violate.
380 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 23:357
tion 1201 threatens ordinary people with financial ruin or even a prison sen-
tence” when they exercise their First Amendment freedom of expression.107
The suit is based on the following key arguments: that certain instances
of circumvention, like security research, constitute an antecedent step of free
speech (the final step being publishing results of said research), and that
those steps are protected by the First Amendment; that the triennial rulemak-
ing process is an unconstitutional speech-licensing regime; that the entirety
of § 1201 is an unconstitutional speech-licensing regime.108
Were such a challenge to be successful, an entirely new legal mecha-
nism to address circumvention would have to be created, and it is unclear
how ACV circumvention would be treated by that regime. It is possible that
it would be usurped into an entirely separate ACV law that addresses all of
its facets, not just circumvention.
G. Copyright: An Ill-suited Tool
  It is worth asking why the Copyright Office would be responsible for ACV
anti-jailbreaking policies in the first place. Why should copyright policy help
regulate motor vehicle safety concerns? The copyright system is fraught
with tension: existing provisions of the Copyright Act, agency rulemaking,
judicial interpretations, and private-sector efforts, are what is relied upon to
maintain balance in the system.109 It is unwise to use such an unstable sys-
tem to regulate the complex development of ACVs.
The unique circumstance of ACV jailbreaks, namely that they are a
software circumvention with a serious risk of injury or death, would make it
sensible for Congress or NHTSA to enact legislation or regulation to address
their legality. Such a measure should do so with an eye to DMCA § 1201
and its exemption process, specifically excluding ACV jailbreaks from being
exempted in the first place, and circumscribing a narrow set of conditions for
which a jailbreak would be legal. It might also specify, for example, that
only ACV manufacturers and authorized third parties may modify a vehicle
operating system.
107. Id.
108. “To be sure, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003), the Supreme Court
found that Congress has substantial authority to legislate under the Copyright Clause without
running afoul of the First Amendment, but that holding was subject to a vital qualification:
such legislation must adhere to the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright. Id. at 221. The Court
specifically identified the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use as ‘built-in First Amendment
accommodations’ that mark those contours. In Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012),
the Court renewed its recognition that copyright law embraces the idea/expression dichotomy
and fair use as ‘speech-protective purposes and safeguards’ that, if disturbed, would subject
the law at issue to ordinary First Amendment scrutiny. Id.” Memorandum in Support of Mo-
tion for Prremiminary Inunction on Behalf of Plaintiff at 15, Green v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
No. 16-cv-01492-EGS (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2016), ECF No. 16, https://www.eff.org/document/
green-v-doj-motion-preliminary-injunction.
109. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 97, at Fn. 178 (citing Microsoft Initial Com-
ments at 9).
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Furthermore, ACV jailbreaking might be deterred entirely by strong
state legislation governing the technology generally.
H. ACV-specific Statutes
  Many states are also in the midst of drafting ACV development statutes
that could impose broad criminal liability onto jailbreak-side parties.110 Leg-
islation in Michigan is one such example.111 Several bills have been enacted
into law, and a few are still in process. One of the passed laws exempts
manufacturers from liability if “another person” converts or attempts to con-
vert their motor vehicle into an automated one (and includes provisions for
installation and modification of equipment to achieve such ends),112 indi-
rectly placing such liability on jailbreak-side parties. Two bills in the Michi-
gan State Senate go a step further. One provides that:
“A person shall not intentionally access or cause access to be made
to an electronic system of a motor vehicle to intentionally destroy,
damage, impair, alter, or gain unauthorized control of the motor
vehicle.”
The punishment specified is “imprisonment for life or any term of years”.113
Another specifies that “access[ing] electronic systems of motor vehicle to
obtain data or control of vehicle” is a Class A felony punishable by a statu-
tory maximum of life imprisonment. This is as strong a deterrent against
jailbreaking as any of the civil and criminal penalties imposed by DMCA
§ 1203 and 1204.
As the notable autonomous vehicle law scholar Bryant Walker Smith
has written regarding this proposed legislation:
“The primary intent of these bills is, I would hope, to prohibit mali-
cious interference with a vehicle. The broad language of [these
bills] goes far beyond any such aim. A literal interpretation would
make criminals out of manufacturers that send over-the-air updates
to their vehicles, vehicle owners who accept such updates, repair
110. Daniel A. Crane, Kyle D. Logue, & Bryce C. Pilz, A Survey of Legal Issues Arising
from the Deployment of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles at 3 (July 2016) U of Michigan
Public Law Research Paper No. 510, U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-015,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2807059 (“Having previously adopted autonomous vehicle testing
regulations, the California Department of Motor Vehicles on December 16, 2015 released its
much awaited draft regulations for the non-testing deployment of autonomous vehicles.”).
111. See e.g., Johana Bhuiyan, Michigan just became the first state to pass comprehen-
sive self-driving regulations, RECODE (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.recode.net/2016/12/9/138900
80/michigan-dot-self-driving-cars-laws-automakers.
112. S.B. 998, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017), https://www.legislature.mi.gov/docu
ments/2015-2016/publicact/pdf/2016-PA-0335.pdf.
113. S.B. 927 (Mich. 2016), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2015-2016/bill
engrossed/Senate/pdf/2016-SEBS-0927.pdf.
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shops that run diagnostics checks while fixing vehicles, owners who
install new stereos, automated driving startups that modify produc-
tion vehicles, researchers who test the safety of vehicle electronics,
and many others. These bills are particularly troublesome in light of
the assertion by some automakers that they alone “own” the
software on vehicles that they have already sold. If these bills move
forward, they should be limited to instances in which a person acts
in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others.”
Legislators are not fully aware of all the nuances involved in “hacking”, and
the legitimate instances thereof (i.e. security research) which could lead to
negative consequences for an essential part of ACV development and de-
ployment.114 In any case, such legislation could be a realistic alternative to
copyright regulation of ACV jailbreaking.
IV. CONCLUSION
  It is without doubt that ACVs will transform human mobility. It is also the
case that ACV owners will be sufficiently incentivized to jailbreak their ve-
hicles to unlock unauthorized functionality.
Liability could incur under the copyright regime, as well as the criminal
and tort regimes, at both state and federal levels. Some or all jailbreak-side
parties are vulnerable to such liability, depending on the nature of the event,
from developers, distributors, installers, to end-users.
Given the current state of the law in this area, both technologists and
policy makers should pay heed to the various scenarios envisioned in this
paper and adjust their actions accordingly.
Technologists should seize upon the 2015 Exemptions to DMCA §1201,
namely the vehicle modification and security research exemptions, and use
that as a basis to justify the legal jailbreaking of ACVs for at least limited
purposes – enabling owners to responsibly maximize the functionality of
their product within the bounds of a safe and secure environment. Manufac-
turers should use as a model the relationship of other technology companies
to their enthusiast jailbreaking communities, and try to build a similar
symbiotic relationship.
Policy makers should realize that prohibiting ACV jailbreaking outright
is anti-competitive, and that the incentives to jailbreak are too numerous and
compelling to go unaddressed. ACV jailbreaking should be permitted under
a narrow set of circumstances, and should not be regulated under the copy-
right system, but instead the main stakeholder in motor vehicle safety:
NHTSA.
114. This is unusual, since the Michigan proposal is considered to be among the most
advanced of state ACV development statutes (e.g., it does not require a certification process to
be an ACV company, broadly defined).
